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Abstract There are three dominant conceptual developments in Althusser’s work that suggest the significance 
of the subject. One is the perpetual work of ideology—its interpellation of individuals. The second is the 
primacy of the class struggle in relation to the state, and the consequential function of law and rights. The third 
is the materialism of the encounter as a process without subject. An examination of these three areas (in part, 
utilising a Foucauldian analysis of subjectivity and power relations) reveals the potentially and strategically 
important role of legal subjectivity in Althusser’s theory of the political. 
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The notion of the subject in Althusser’s work is illusory. It is illusory in the sense that it appears to be an 
undefined (even undefinable) concept, while at the same time functionally significant, serving as a strategy to 
disguise the nature of the struggles in the socio-political field. Thus, Althusser’s own uses of the concept betray 
feelings simultaneously of distrust and commitment. On the one hand, the reference to history—thus of the 
political—as a process without subject goes beyond the anti-humanism with which his early philosophy is often 
associated. It speaks positively of a condition for philosophical thought in which the political is not mediated by 
the subject-object dichotomy. On the other hand, the thesis on the role of ideology interpellating individuals as 
subjects promotes the urgency of analysing the structural conditions from which the ideological state 
apparatuses take effect in producing subjectivities. This assumes that the state of being a subject—in the dual 
sense of being subjected to and being the subject of—has a certain reality, an ontological presence, which is 
crucial to the understanding of the work of ideology in society.   
It may be that this ambivalent relationship to subjectivity is meaningful in the context of Althusser’s 
so-called methodological ‘turn to the aleatory’, in the sense that the singularity and unpredictability in the 
encounter establish, precisely in the negation of teleology, a possible space for emergent, resistant subjectivities, 
as Antonio Negri and others have suggested. In any case, if we are to take seriously this ambivalent approach to 
the subject—which is to say, that we do not merely relegate it to the contradiction between the ideological and 
‘aleatory’ approaches to materialism, or indeed the assumed inconsistency in the thinking of an ‘early’ and ‘late’ 
Althusser—there is a need to account for Althusser’s vision of the subject-in-being, in Foucauldian terms, the 
individual who is always in the process of formation. Scholars of Althusser’s philosophical texts have identified 
certain, distinctive conceptual developments within his late works, among them the idea that the political, 
existing separately and in a variable relationship to social antagonisms, is self-instituting (or self-constituting).  
It is the fact that the political reproduces the relations of production, making possible the class struggle, that 
gives law (the power to legitimise norms and implement rights) a determinative function within the state 
machine—it marks the transformation of force into power. By the same token, the separation of the political 
sphere from that of social antagonism, and the process of the self-constitution of the state form, are theoretically 
2 
 
continuous with the contingency of the state as reflecting constituted power. This not only places in contention 
the origin and stability of the political, but introduces a qualification in the relation of subjectivity, thus the 
relation of the subject to the state. If the individual is not reducible to the legal subject, the emancipatory role of 
rights that the discourse claims for itself is placed in contention. If the legal subject is only ever produced in the 
rupture of the political and the aleatory reality of the social, it becomes necessary to consider whether political 
resistance remains feasible only in the context of the abandonment of the juridically-constituted subject, and 
indeed whether such a condition is tenable. 
 
 
When the exterior implicates an interior: on the subjective double 
 
To understand the precise conditions for Althusser’s dilemma, both that which he proposes in liberation of 
structural Marxism and that which he himself must escape to justify a non-metaphysical application of Marx’s 
philosophy, we need to reconsider initially the terms of his interpretation of Marx’s ‘epistemological break’. The 
theoretical rupture between the humanist or anthropological philosophy of the young Marx and the radical  
theory of history and politics in the post 1844 writings invokes a methodological inversion as much as a 
reconstitution of philosophical praxis. Althusser’s interpretation places great store in the scientificity1 of the new 
concepts associated with historical materialism: ‘social formation, productive forces, relations of production, 
superstructure, ideologies, determination in the last instance by the economy, specific determination of the other 
levels, etc.’ (Althusser 2005, p.193). Beyond the radical critique of humanist philosophy is the creation of a new 
discursive domain that illuminates a substantially different problematic—the situation of specific levels of 
human practice within the social structure, in place of the essentiality of man—which in turn depends upon a 
new tool—the scientific mapping of the historical conditions for determined processes. If Marxist theory is able 
to undermine the dual implication of the transcendental subject, namely, the empiricism of the subject and the 
idealism of human essence, it is because a distinct form of dialectics is at play: historical materialism reverses 
the question of establishing objective truth at the level of human thought or consciousness; because truth is 
already situated at the level of praxis, practice being the origin and criterion of all truth, the approach of 
scientific practice to the ensuing confrontation (of ideas and nature, consciousness and the real) ‘entails 
recognition of the primacy of external reality over ideas or consciousness, which, in this practice, models itself 
on reality’ (Althusser 1997a, pp. 251-252). It is relatively clear, then, that scientific practice cannot be reduced 
to self-consciousness, and that the fundamental task of philosophy as a theoretical practice2 is the ‘actual 
critique of the illusions of any “consciousness”, denying the possibility of any subject of history’ (Balibar 1993, 
p.6).  
 Within this methodological paradigm, subjectivity is viewed merely as a reflection of the necessary 
function of ideology; at the same time, ideology is conceived as a complex form, or rather, as giving form to a 
 
1 Such a reading in not without its concessions: postulating the ‘theoretico-scientific’ Marx that emerges from the errors of 
the Hegelian Marx raises its own historical questions about theory and objectivity; failing to attempt a genealogy of the pre-
conditions for the new scientific method runs the risk of producing a new ‘positivism’—see Derrida’s comments in his 
interview on the topic of the relationship between Althusserianism and deconstruction (1993, p. 197).  
 
2 ‘We can assert the primacy of practice theoretically by showing that all levels of social existence are the sites of distinct 
practices: economic practice, political practice, ideological practice, technical practice and scientific (or theoretical) practice’ 
(Althusser and Balibar 2009, p. 63). 
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complex, asymmetrical set of relations. At the structural level, Althusser’s conception of ideology breaks free of 
teleological development: neither social processes nor sites of human agency can be considered to be the causes 
of ideology; instead they are simultaneously determined and determining functions that become meaningful in 
the context of ideological forces. Here, the notion of overdetermination becomes crucial, since, outside of a 
causal mode of analysis, it is the differential movement inherent in social processes—the changes, 
transformations, contradictions—that explains the ‘material’, constitutive foundation of ideas and consciousness 
as well as their field of operation. Nonetheless, we do encounter the difficulty of understanding how ‘ideology’ 
is conceived, particularly in light of Althusser’s reference to ideology as an ‘ideological concept’ (1971). For 
ideology to be freed from all constraints associated with interiority (the ideas, beliefs, illusory perceptions), if it 
is, rather, to have an omnipresence that is implicated in and guides external reality, it effectively must be 
immanent to all social entities and relations, being neither cause nor product of the apparatuses. Let us examine 
the logic of this presupposition in Althusser’s own terms.  
In the first instance, ideology, ‘endowed with a structure and a functioning such as to make it a non-
historical reality’, namely, immutable throughout history (paralleling the concept of the unconscious in Freud—
‘ideology is external, exactly like the unconscious’), may be conceptualised only in relation to the existence of 
an actual, historical reality, the ‘concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their 
existence’. ‘Ideology in general’—Marx’s imaginary assemblage, the pure, empty dream—is the ahistorical or 
omni-historical reality that remains present in the same form within ‘the history of social formations containing 
social classes’ (1971, pp. 160-161).  In short, ideology is immanent, not transcendent. This leads to a particular 
understanding on the representative enterprise of ideology: ‘Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of 
individuals to their real conditions of existence’ (1971, p. 162). It cannot be the real conditions of existence that 
men represent to themselves in ideology, which would entail that ideology mirror (suggesting some consistency 
or direct association) those conditions; the true question is not one of causation, but of the rationale for the 
imaginary relation of individuals to the social relations governing their conditions of existence. There is, thus, an 
ontological distinction between the system of existing relations of production (and derivative social relations) 
and the imagined—necessarily distorted or illusory—relations represented by ideology. 
In the second instance, Althusser’s thesis that ideology has a material existence—if not seemingly 
paradoxical in suggesting the materiality of an ideal—is critical to the formulation of Ideological State 
Apparatuses and their practices being the realisation of an ideology, ideology always existing in the apparatuses 
and their practices. As Montag observes, this approach precludes the temporal and causal priority of ideology 
and ‘eliminates any notion that ideology can exist external to its material form’ (1995, p. 62). The argument that 
belief and consciousness do not pre-exist the behaviour and actions of individuals but are consubstantial with 
them implicates the exteriority of discourses as much as practices. The chain of materiality inscribed in the 
relation of the subject and the existence of the ideas of his belief is thus: ‘his ideas are his material actions 
inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material 
ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject’ (Althusser, 1971, p. 168). Beyond the 
circularity of this equation there remains the problem of conceptualising the subjectivity inherent in the 
individual whose beliefs and actions are ineluctably bound up with the ideological apparatus; in what sense is 
this exterior meaningful where it does not stand in any relation to an interior?—in other words, what room is 
there for the expression of subjectivity given the immanence of ideology? 
4 
 
 The centrality of Althusser’s thesis on the subject for his conceptualisation of ideology is attested by 
his own emphatic formula: ‘the category of the subject is only constitutive of all ideology insofar as all ideology 
has the function (which defines it) of “constituting” concrete individuals as subjects’ (1971, p. 171). There are a 
number of hypotheses that purport to explain this strange construction. One is that individuals are always-
already subjects, in the sense that they constantly and continuously practise the rituals of ideological 
recognition. This is so to the extent that even revolutionary activity is defined by and circumscribed within an 
ideological mentality. 3  Indeed, there is more at stake here than the perpetual or interminable quality of 
subjection (the always); we must acknowledge that the interpellation of the subject is also a process without 
origin (the already). The production of subjectivity presupposes that individuals are necessarily abstract, the 
individual reflecting the institutions and practices of the society into which he is born and to which his 
existential needs are adapted. Further, being a subject is ultimately a matter of ‘obviousness’, in the sense of 
both transparency and immediacy. This, of course, gives rise to the aporia inherent in such a restricted 
conception of consciousness: inevitably, it serves a mediating role, while at the same time being confronted with 
the obviousness of the subject. The rejoinder argues, instead, that consciousness merely provides the individual 
with an awareness of his partaking of the incessant practice of ideological recognition, whereas knowledge of 
the mechanism of this recognition remains the object of our radicalised scientific method (see Althusser 1971, 
pp. 172-173).  
 It is not altogether clear whether the thesis on the interpellation of subjects can escape its logico-
grammatical formulation, even with a reading sympathetic to the influence of Spinoza (which, of course, 
Althusser encourages). It would appear to be a solipsistic conclusion that the interpellation of the subject 
presupposes the existence of the subject, notwithstanding that the subject cannot be seen to have a defined birth 
or emergence. One possibility is to suggest that, rather than ideology transforming individuals into subjects, 
interpellation is itself the process of subjectivation. Močnik suggests, along this line of analysis, the existence of 
two interdependent mechanisms operative in the interpellation-subjectivity relation: subjectivation proper, being 
a purely formal symbolic mechanism with the same stereotypic structure; and identification, the imaginary 
relation concerned with the ideological conflict as an instance of class struggle (1993, p. 140). The double 
nature of the process (symbolic and imaginary) might work to ameliorate the contradiction in ideology, that of 
representing a reality of which it is itself part, but the concern with subjectivation being a reference to its own 
instance, namely, a pre-existing subject, remains live. In fact, we cannot assume that Althusser did not perceive 
this limitation. His resort to the concept of the ‘Subject’ in the example of religious ideology, the ‘Unique, 
Absolute, Other Subject’ in whose name individuals are interpellated as subjects, demonstrates the doubly 
specularly function of ideology, the ‘duplication of the Subject into subjects and of the Subject itself into a 
subject-Subject’ (1971, p. 180). Here, the Subject operates at the centre of an infinite number of individual 
subjectivations. The mirror-structure of ideology thereby attempts to resolve the paradox in the duality of the 
subject—the free subject that is author of his own actions, and at the same time, the subject that is subjected to a 
higher authority. The individual is interpellated as a (free) subject for the purpose of ensuring his free 
acceptance of his own subjection; in effect, the subject participates in its own subjectivity, in both senses. 
 
3 Thus, Althusser affirms, ‘a subject is always an ideological subject. His ideology may change, shifting from the dominant 
ideology to a revolutionary ideology, but there will always be ideology, because ideology is the condition for the existence 
of individuals’ (2006, p. 285). 
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Importantly, the focus in this schema shifts from the interiority of individual subjectivity to the workings of the 
actual mechanism, the dual process of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ subjectivation.  
 Formulated in this way, we are perhaps moving closer to a Foucauldian approach to subjectivity, even 
as Foucault’s distrust of the term ‘ideology’ and critique of its uses in Marxist discourse might suggest a lack of 
empathy with the premise of ideology having a material existence. Already in The Archaeology of Knowledge 
Foucault proposes the task of examining the manifest construction and practical situation of knowledge, as a 
system of ideas, values and beliefs held together by distinct positivities or practices. Ideology would be merely 
one structural element of the conditions for the visibility of knowledge as an assemblage, a historical formation 
determined by discursive and non-discursive practices: ‘The hold of ideology over scientific discourse and the 
ideological functioning of the sciences are not articulated at the level of their ideal structure…nor at the level of 
their technical use in society…nor at the level of the consciousness of the subjects that built it up; they are 
articulated where science is articulated upon knowledge’ (Foucault 1972, p. 185). Moreover, in the analyses of 
specific institutions that lie at the intersection of relations of force constituting power and the formalised strata 
of knowledge, repression and ideology, far from being considered part of the struggle between forces, are 
treated as the mere effects of these struggles, since they necessarily operate within an established organisation of 
relations. Discipline, and the norm through which social space is rendered interdisciplinary and homogenising, 
is productive rather than repressive, producing and intensifying according to the logic of individualisation 
(Ewald 1992, p. 171). In short, power produces the reality that permits repression, and the truth that serves 
ideology.4 Thus, for Foucault, the fact that it is principally bodies and their thinking, rather than consciousness 
and interiority, which are at stake in the practices of subjection, suggests that one must necessarily look beyond 
the instruments of violence and ideology in order to understand the various (material) modalities of these 
mechanisms of subjectivation (Montag 1995, p.72). If we allow ourselves to interpret Althusser’s thesis on the 
interpellated subject through the lens of Foucault’s disciplinary analysis, as Montag (1995) proposes, the 
problem of the materiality of ideology could be reformulated in terms of the relation between the fictitious 
construct of reality created by the ideological representation of society and the specific technology of power 
(discipline) that individualises bodies, producing subjects.  
 There are sufficient convergences in the thinking of Althusser and Foucault to warrant our attention, 
especially with respect to the critique of humanism,5 and the material dependency and non-teleological nature of 
the subject, although Foucault’s subject has a transformative—perpetually self-constitutive—character that is 
less obvious in Althusser’s thesis. Foucault is quite explicit in declaring the problem of humanism as being its 
invention of a series of subjected sovereignties: ‘ the soul (ruling the body, but subjected to God), consciousness 
(sovereign in a context of judgment, but subjected to the necessities of truth), the individual (a titular control of 
 
4 ‘The individual is no doubt the fictitious atom of an `ideological' representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated 
by this specific technology of power that I have called `discipline'. We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of 
power in negative terms: it `excludes', it `represses', it `censors', it `abstracts', it `masks', it `conceals'. In fact, power 
produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may 
be gained of him belong to this production’ (Foucault 1979, p. 194).  
5 Though the intellectual relationship between Althusser and Foucault is one which largely must be constructed from their 
respective texts, Foucault did acknowledge Althusser’s influence in the form of his re-examination of Marx’s writings—in 
terms of a reliance upon a conception of human nature, of the subject, and of alienated man by certain Marxist theorists—
thus, a shared methodological concern with ‘the reevaluation of the theory of the subject’(Foucault 2001, p. 251). 
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personal rights subjected to the laws of nature and society), basic freedom (sovereign within, but accepting the 
demands of an outside world and “aligned with destiny”)’ (1977, p. 221). It is in this sense—subjected 
sovereignties, or double subjectivation—that Delueze (1992) reads Foucault’s notion of subjectivity as bound up 
with the visual motif of the fold. The ‘foldings’ (purposefully plural, for subjectivity is conceived as a 
multiplicity) refer to the doubling process intrinsic to thinking, the interiorisation of the outside. There are a 
couple of functional principles bound up with the idea of interiorisation. First, the folding-unfolding movement 
is inscribed in the subjectivation process, witnessing the transformation of the free man into subjection: it 
involves, on the one hand, being controlled and dependent on others via ‘all the processes of individuation and 
modulation which power installs’, and on the other, binding the subject to his own identity by a conscience or 
self-knowledge fashioned through the codes and techniques derived from the moral and human sciences 
(Deleuze 1992, p. 103). Thus, even the relation to oneself does not exist in a solitary and self-contained place 
independent of the outside (the institutional and the social); rather, it operates within the field of pre-existing 
relations, defined by them and in turn reconstituting them. The ethical relation is conceived as part of the 
broader ontological process—and, indeed, engaged through a new form of epistemology—of the constitution of 
the self as an object of knowledge, in the dual sense of the object of one’s own reflection (the truth obligation) 
and the object of a scientific organisation of knowledge (Foucault 1997, p. 177). Second, the inside is 
necessarily coextensive with the outside, but an outside that is deeper and more distant—spatially and 
temporally—than any exterior. 6  Or, reading with Heidegger, the intentionality of being, through which 
consciousness has free reign, gives way to the fold of Being (Deleuze 1992, p.110). Thinking, being neither 
innate nor acquired, can only come from the outside, thus the variables or conditions for thought are at the same 
time those concerned with the production of subjectivities. The topological relation of the folding of the outside 
establishes the limit for thought, albeit in a way that internalises external environments: to think is to be 
restricted to the ‘present-time stratum’, but through a past that is condensed within the inside (the ‘present’ 
subject is always a historically-constituted subject) and with the function to resist and re-think the present. In 
Deleuze’s eloquent formula, ‘Thought thinks its own history (the past), but in order to free itself from what it 
thinks (the present) and be able finally to “think otherwise” (the future)’ (1992, p. 119). Folding thus has 
ramifications for political and ethical activity; it presents the possibility of new forms of struggle, as new forms 
subjectivity. 
 Althusser, in a different vein, also speaks of the mirrored or folded relationship between the internal 
and external, in this case with respect to the subject’s interpellation through ideology. To be within ideology—
which is to say, to be the subject of ideological recognition, or ‘hailing’—is to be the object of a ruse, the mere 
apparition or appearance of being outside of ideology, for it is the inherent effect of ideology to create the belief 
that one is not subject to ideological intervention. While scientific knowledge operates on the basis that ideology 
can be the object of analysis, thus that there must be a space external to ideology, ‘ideology has no outside (for 
itself), but at the same time that it is nothing but outside (for science and reality)’ (1971, p. 175). The 
‘speculary’ structure of all ideology—the inside reflecting an outside that in fact is the entire reality—operates 
 
6 Deleuze speaks of the relation of the interior and exterior, in the context of the fold in the Baroque, in terms of an infinite 
receptivity and an infinite spontaneity. Their conciliation produces a new harmony, but on the premise that ‘the expressed 
does not exist beyond its expressions’ (Deleuze 1991, p. 243). As with the baroque model (in art and architecture), multiple 
subjectivities may be produced, infinite relations with oneself, but these modalities of folds are contained by the process of 




by way of a quadruple system of interpellation: individuals are interpellated as subjects; they thereby are 
subjected to the Subject; there is mutual (i.e. universal) recognition of subjects, within and among themselves; 
and, there is the absolute guarantee that this constitutes the way things are (1971, p. 181). This manifold process 
facilitates and regularises the concrete, material behaviour of individuals, such that subjects ‘work by 
themselves’, echoing the productive effects of individualising disciplinary control (whether in the context of 
criminality, labour or sexuality) discussed in Foucault’s genealogical investigations. Indeed, there is no 
subjectivity without this (freely adopted) subjection. The sense of freedom is merely one of the effects of 
ideology, coded in institutions and social practices. Thus, subjectivity refers to the determination by ideological 
social relations, at once illusory—since ideology necessarily represents a distorted simulacrum of reality—and 
natural—interpellation is violently and abruptly imposed on individuals through their ‘free consciousness’.7  
 If Althusser’s thesis appears to resolve the problem of the duality of subjectivity, with the subject being 
meaningful only in the sense of this abstract mechanism that qualifies the transformative capacity of the 
individual-subject, it is not without some logical circularity. We are reminded of Jacques Rancière’s critique of 
Althuserrianism on the count of the speculative division between science (concepts) and ideology (words), being 
essentially a theory of representation. For Althusser, ‘man’ in Marx’s ant-humanism is constrained within a 
class discourse in which he is merely an image reflecting and masking the conditions of bourgeois domination. 
‘The bourgeoisie’s ideological power is thus described as the superposition of systems of representation: the 
system of judicial inscription transcribes trade relations; juridical ideology is reflected in the discourse of ‘man’ 
and ‘subject’. The efficiency of power in ideology is nothing other than the efficiency of a representation of the 
conditions for the existence of that power’ (2011, p. 95). There is the risk that ideology merely reiterates the 
‘interplay between essence and appearance’, 8 and that the subject reveals itself to be nothing other than the 
abstract entity that Marx’s ‘scientific’ critique sought to undermine. 
  
 
The state and its apparatuses only have meaning from the point of view of the class struggle: the primacy 
of force 
 
As Althusser explains, what is truly at stake in the process of the mirror recognition of the Subject and the 
interpellation of individuals as subjects is the reproduction of the relations of production and those relations 
deriving from them. Moreover, it is the class nature of the ideologies, that they are realised in institutions, their 
rituals and their practices, that accounts for the methodological shift (from the abstract to the particular, the 
 
7 Althusser gives by way of example the case of the worker as ‘subject’—by the time he arrives at his workplace he has 
already been subjected, voluntarily or involuntarily, to ideological forces that determine his decision to offer his services in 
exchange for the purchase of his labour-power: among other things, ‘the worker has been “formed” to conform to certain 
social norms that regulate behaviour: punctuality, efficiency, obedience, responsibility, family love and recognition of all 
forms of authority’ (2006, p. 283). 
 
8 Indeed, the dialectics of essence/appearance, inside/outside, subject/object, call for an even more acute vigilance due to the 
indeterminate and infected nature of these oppositions. As Derrida remarks apropos the task of determining the effects of 
ideality, signification, meaning and reference in relation to the text: ‘The outside can always become an “object” in the 
polarity subject/object, or the reassuring reality of what is outside the text; and there is sometimes an “inside” that is as 





general to the specific) in analysing ideology’s role in social formations. 9  The state form, then, is to be 
conceptualised in the context of the perpetual class struggle. It is characterised as a machine or apparatus 
precisely to denote its instrumental nature, and as the instrument of the dominant class it is necessarily separate 
not only from society but also from the class struggle itself, from which position it is able to dominate those it 
exploits and perpetuate the conditions of exploitation and oppression (Althusser 2006, p. 100). The state—and 
its politics, and the ideology that sustains it—is therefore separate and above the class struggle in a twofold 
sense. The political exists by virtue of, and indeed to conserve and maintain, the reproduction of the conditions 
of domination in its broadest connotation: not merely the reproduction of the conditions of ‘social relations’ and 
‘productive relations’, but also the ‘reproduction of the material conditions of the relations of production and 
exploitation’ (Althusser 2006, p. 120). The autonomy of the political is ensured by the permanency of class 
conflict, simply because the political reproduces the antagonistic relations of production. Second, at the level of 
the organisation of power, the state-machine transforms force or the violence of class struggle—by which is 
meant the excess of the dominant class’ force over the force of the dominated classes—into right, laws and 
norms (Althusser 2006, pp. 108-109). The embodiment of the state form, with its various agents and their 
nominated functions (administrative, monitoring, policing, juridical), serves no other purpose than this 
transformation of energy, and ultimately produces nothing except legal power. The logic of this transformative 
process is extrapolated in Althusser’s interpretation of Machiavelli’s thesis on the emergence of a principality: 
the new state to be formed, in order to become a national state, ‘must be equipped with laws expressing the 
balance of forces in the class struggle between nobles and people’, a struggle in which the Prince must take the 
side of the people, a struggle which is indispensable to the state’s capacity to both survive and expand 
(Althusser 2000, p. 62). Viewed schematically, there are two moments in the constitution of a state. In the first, 
its foundation, the abstract formal moment of beginnings, the founder lays the foundation of the edifice by 
decreeing laws, thus becoming the lawgiver. The second is the ‘concrete, organic moment either of the 
penetration of the laws thus decreed into the antagonistic social classes, or of the production of laws by popular 
struggle against the nobles’ (Althusser 2000, p. 65).  In this latter stage, the mechanism of laws is the principal 
vehicle for the rooting of the prince’s power in the people, and the latter is the absolute condition for the state’s 
duration and power.  
 Does this analysis on the separate and self-instituting character of the political allow Althusser’s thesis 
to escape the conventional philosophico-juridical discourse of sovereignty, a discourse that presupposes the 
existence of the subject of rights? To approach a response we must perhaps pose a more precise question: what 
has happened to the subject—where is the subject located, or how has it been displaced—with this separation of 
the political from the class struggle? At the very least, Althusser has entirely evaded, if not overturned, the 
contradictions in the relationship between state and society prevalent in traditional Marxist theory. 10 The state’s 
function is defined by, rather than in contest with, the reality of social antagonism. Where the origin of the state 
 
9 In one sense, such a shift is necessary in order to explain how an otherwise ‘closed system of ideological production’ opens 
the space for conflict and contradiction with respect to individual interpellations by ideological state apparatuses: ‘A 
distinction must be made, then, between the general functioning of ideology that produces a particular notion of the 
individual subject, and the specific functioning of different ideologies that produce contradictions within and between 
subjects’ (Grant 2005, p. 11). 
  
10 For Miguel Vatter (2004), this entails an inversion of the Marxist basis-superstructure schema on the basis that the 
‘struggle between classes is a factum of politics before being an economic or social datum’; see, also, Montag’s (2004) 




lies with the ‘real’ of the class struggle under the effects of the ideological state apparatuses, the concepts of 
base and superstructure are no longer meaningful, which is to say that the structural paradigm in which these 
terms take effect fails to account for the very existence of social antagonism and the relational dependencies 
through which it is preserved, namely, the primacy of the class struggle with respect to production and the 
primacy of the political with respect to the class struggle (see Vatter 2004, §15).11 Moreover, the reproduction of 
exploitative relations in the form of rights and laws establishes the legitimacy of the control of class conflict, 
thus of the special function of the state. If it is not possible to break from the circularity of the state, it is simply 
because the reproduction of the material and social conditions necessarily involves and implies the reproduction 
also of the state and its forms, while the state has the special function of maintaining and conserving the 
reproduction of existing class society (Althusser 2006, p. 125). In effect, Althusser’s theory of the state eschews 
the concern for establishing right as the principal determinant of the political relation between subjects; instead, 
the state and its forms—including the ideological state apparatuses through which subjects are produced—
merely legitimise the reproduction of the conditions of existence of the domination of the exploiting class. In 
this schema, law plays the part of a formal system of legality, a legalising power empty of any virtues of 
autonomy and positivism, and distinct from relations of production. The formal system of law, ‘not despite but 
because of its formality and systematicity, depends upon a series of repressive and ideological supplements, that 
is, a locus of exteriority’ (McGee 2012, p. 147).  
 Again, we can attain some clarity in understanding Althusser’s challenge to structural Marxism by 
extending a connection to Foucault’s thesis on security as an analytics of power. In his lectures titled ‘security, 
territory, population’ Foucault continues his genealogy of power by examining historically the mechanisms 
through which the biological fact of the human species becomes the object of a political strategy. For example, 
the Eighteenth century witnesses a re-orientation of the central concern for the political and economic 
management of society, under the imperative of controlling particular crises (such as the effects of scarcity from 
food shortages, or endemic-epidemic diseases), from the individual political and legal subject to the population, 
both as a natural phenomenon and a complex field for the application of governmental rationality. The 
population, as the object of economic-political analysis, no longer appears as the collection of individual wills 
tied by obedience to sovereign authority, but rather as ‘a set of processes to be managed at the level and on the 
basis of what is natural in these processes’ (2009, p. 70). The departure point for this politico-epistemic program 
is the given, the existential fact or naturalness of phenomena—phenomena which lend themselves to statistical 
analysis, distributive calculations, quantification and classification of variables, and so on—which thereby 
implicates the necessity and function of government; it is effectively a scientific discourse, one concerned with 
the dynamics in society, with its physical properties (as the physiocrats attest), as against the structural stasis of 
juridical discourse, with its conceptual paradigms—whether the contractual relationship of sovereign to subject, 
or the teleology of popular sovereignty (res publica). 12  In a parallel discussion, Foucault argues that an 
 
11 Viewed in terms of the division between constituted and constituent power, it could be said that by reproducing the 
‘exploitative relations in which the productive forces are exercised, the constituted power makes the “real” of social 
antagonism (dis-) appear as constituent power…the revolutionary power to begin the political “out of nothing”, ex nihilo, as 
if it were self-grounding, auto-constitutive’ (Vatter 2004, §17). 
 
12 This methodological agenda is clearly articulated throughout the lectures from 1975 on: ‘Rather than looking at the three 
prerequisites of law, unity, and subject—which make sovereignty both the source of power and the basis of institutions—I 
think that we have to adopt the threefold point of view of the techniques, the heterogeneity of techniques, and the 
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appreciation of the liberal moment in politics demands the reconceptualisation of the notion of ‘freedom’, from 
its metaphysical signification—the property of the ethical or political subject—to a technological 
signification—a legally-sanctioned instrument of power relations. Both in the sense of ideology and as a 
technique of government, ‘freedom’ is to be understood in the context of the mutations and transformations of 
technologies of power, as the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of security. In fact, the functioning of 
an apparatus of security relies upon the existence of relative freedoms, certainly as they were conceived in the 
Eighteenth century: ‘no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the possibility of 
movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of both people and things’ (2009, pp. 48-49).  
 Both Althusser and Foucault situate politics within a matrix of forces, forces that have their own 
trajectories, whose logic defies the rational self-justification associated with conventional philosophical 
treatments of political power. These forces, or relations of power, are distinguished from both the forms 
(clusters) of political and economic subjection and the institutions and technologies of government. For 
Athusser, the separation of the state-machine and its special function—the reproduction of itself on the basis of 
its own effects—constitutes a system with complex mechanisms, perpetually masking its functions behind its 
apparatus, and vice versa, and its reproduction behind its interventions (Althusser 2006, p. 126). What is at stake 
in a philosophy of praxis is the unveiling of this masquerade, an attempt to understand the ensemble of the 
forms of class domination, its defence in and perpetuation through the pre-eminent mechanism of the state and 
its production of power (as right, political laws and ideological norms). In Foucault, we find a less structural 
analysis of this matrix. Relations of production and reproduction constitute merely particular types of relations 
(as with familial or sexual relations) through which mechanisms of power are exercised. It is less a matter of 
power being imposed upon such relations, for the purpose of acting on them, to modify or orient them in a 
particular direction for the sake of a certain objective, as the mechanisms of power being intrinsic to these 
relations, as both their effect and cause. The multiplicity of force relations are elements of the struggles and 
confrontations in society, and indeed one can take the permanency of these struggles (between individuals, 
groups, classes) as a principle from which to analyse power relations; however, at any given time and within a 
given field, the mechanisms of power intersect via ‘lateral co-ordinations, hierarchical subordinations, 
isomomorphic correspondences, technical identities or analogies, and chain effects’ (Foucault 2009, p. 2), and it 
is the singularity of these encounters—being neither ontological nor teleological— that should be investigated. 
  
 
A process without subject 
 
At this point it is worth considering, if only provisionally and schematically, Althusser’s later concern with the 
‘materialism of the encounter’. The extent to which this concern represents a break with his previous 
interpretations of Marxist philosophy, and possibly a departure from Marxism itself, is of no special import for 
our current focus. More revealing is the interest in the historicism of an alternative (which is to say, non-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
subjugation-effects that make technologies of domination the real fabric of both power relations and the great apparatuses of 




metaphysical) philosophical tradition,13 and, consequently, the potential conceptual openings for a novel critique 
of political and legal subjectivity. Utilising the terminology of Heidegger and Derrida in particular, Althusser 
defines the materialism of the encounter by the contrast with ‘any idealism of consciousness or reason’; it is 
characterised by the primacy of positivity over negativity, the swerve over the straight trajectory, disorder over 
order, and by the negation of all teleology (whether rational, secular, moral, political or aesthetic). It is the 
‘materialism, not of a subject (be it God or the proletariat), but of a process, a process that has no subject, yet 
imposes on the subjects (individuals or others) which it dominates the order of its development, with no 
assignable end’ (2006, p. 190).  This enigmatic notion of a ‘process without subject’ is a crucial one for the task 
of a materialist philosophy, that of thinking the theoretical conditions of possibility for the resolution of existing 
contradictions—to situate different social practices under their ideologies, create theoretical schemas for 
overcoming contradiction, and guarantee the truth of this order through rational discourse (p. 287). The 
methodology utilised in Althusser’s historicisation of the philosophy of the encounter is served by at least two 
key concepts: the conjuncture and the contingent. The conjuncture is the joining together of various elements, 
the facticity of events, from which any given form can emerge. It is not a transcendental structure, but the taking 
account of material conditions that present themselves at any given moment due to an infinite number of 
possible causes. Whether political, ideological or philosophical, the ‘conjuncture is the facticity of the world that 
practice confronts, and practice is in turn possible only within the interstices of this facticity, since it can only 
intervene with the relations that constitute practice in the first place’ (Morfino 2005, §52). The contingent refers 
to the aleatory character of the encounter—it is never prefigured insofar as the fact of its occurrence is 
underwritten by the possibility of its non-existence. The encounter emerges from the possibility of nothing—this 
is its radical instability—taking shape as a new regime of facts. There is no overarching determinant, neither 
origin nor end. Thus, Althusser speaks of the ‘necessity of contingency’ in a completely non-teleological 
sense.14 
 The reading of Machiavelli—achieved, in part, through establishing a theoretical continuity between 
Machiavelli’s monarchist (The Prince) and republican (Discourses of Livy) texts—emphasises the problematic 
of the foundation without precedent, the ‘primitive political accumulation’, the concern with the preconditions 
of the constitution of a national state, thinking the fact to be accomplished (a new state under a new prince, its 
durability and longevity) rather than from the accomplished fact of absolute monarchies (Althusser 2000, p. 
121). The subject-less process, as understood through Machiavelli, must account for the ‘irreducible duality’ 
between the subject of the political viewpoint (the people) and the subject of political force and practice (the 
Prince), a division that cannot be reconciled insofar as ‘the people’ does not constitute itself as a political force 
and is not transformed from a multitude into a governmental form. ‘History must be made by the Prince from 
the viewpoint of the people; but the people is not yet “the subject” of history’ (p. 27). One might interpret the 
 
13 Marx can now be read in the context of a philosophical milieu—tracing back to Epicurus and including thinkers as diverse 
as Machiavelli and Spinoza—preoccupied with developing thought of the provisional encounter, the aleatory and contingent, 
based on atomistic principles: ‘from Epicurus to Marx, there had always subsisted…the “discovery” of a profound tradition 
that sought its materialist anchorage in a philosophy of the encounter (and therefore in a more or less atomistic philosophy, 
the atom, in its “fall”, being the simplest figure of individuality)’ (Althusser 2006, p. 188). 
 
14 ‘That is, instead of thinking contingency as a modality of necessity, or an exception to it, we must think necessity as the 




place or subject ‘ the people’ as the perspective of social antagonism;15 its power lies precisely in the fact that 
the political viewpoint is not reduced to the constitution of political forms of government and any political 
practice (Vatter 2004, §26); this would permit the possibility of political agency on the part of the people.16 
However, it has to be conceded that there is very little textual elucidation (the same could be said contextually, 
with regard to the opposition of political viewpoint and political practice) of the signification Althusser intends 
by the use of the term ‘the people’. As a political concept, it can be understood in a differential way, as that part 
of a social whole that is distinct from another part or parts to which it is subordinate. In this sense, the people, as 
demos, constitutes an uprising against the regime rather than the regime itself; it is the subject of revolt, 
suggesting both, and at the same time, an immediate absolute and indivisible dignity that is without measure, 
and over time, the ‘absolute value as an infinite opening that no quality, law, institution, or even identity can 
ever bring to a close’. Alternatively, ‘the people’ may be understood in an integral way, as the whole (the body) 
of social reality; the political sovereignty of the people would entail its self-constitution, preceding any political 
constitution. ‘Here the subject-people is affirmed not as an actor or as a force but first of all as a substance: a 
reality that derives its existence and its movement only from itself’ (Nancy 2010, pp. 38-39). Both meanings 
have some resonance with Althusser’s characterisation of ‘the people’, but neither perfectly accounts for what 
Althusser considers to be crucial in Machiavelli’s treatment of the political practice of the new prince: namely, 
that the state which the prince must lead is rooted in the people—it is a popular state, its popular character 
determining the political practice. The Prince, as the public face of the state, literally acts upon (first through 
acceptance, later to transform) the people’s ideology to achieve his national and popular goals, assuming 
‘responsibility for the ideological effects of his own political practice’; thus, the representation of the figure of 
the Prince serves to mediate the ideological relation between Prince and people (Althusser 2000, pp. 97, 99). It 
is in this purely strategic sense that ‘the people’ is significant. We must avoid the speculative conclusion that a 
theory of popular sovereignty, of the people’s exercise of political power in pursuance of the democratic form, is 
disguised in the Machiavellian readings. Instead, the people remains separate from the political—always as the 
founding moment of constituted power (the state), but never the constituent—the substance or reality rather than 
the actor, in Nancy’s terminology.  
 What, then, is the place of subjectivity within the materialism of the encounter? If this question appears 
as a most urgent one arising from Althusser’s later writings, it is nonetheless one to which he did not attend with 
any clarity and decisiveness. We can only venture to draw together distinct conceptual strands, all the while 
conscious of the fact that Althusser’s work creates more openings than it develops coherent philosophical 
positions. The root of this problematic may be situated at a more fundamental, epistemological level. In posing 
the question, ‘how is a singular individual also a universal?’ Althusser refocuses his gaze upon subjectivity—
and the subject’s situation in knowledge—in terms of the relation of appropriation that the human subject enters 
into with others. All processes of knowledge move from abstract generality to concrete singularity; the reality 
envisaged is that of a universal singularity (Althusser, 1997b,  pp. 7-10).  The possibility that the aleatory nature 
 
15 Althusser reads Machiavelli’s invocation of the people (popolare) as an invocation of a struggle, the class struggle 
between the people and the nobles, in which the Prince must forge an alliance with the people (2000, p. 129). 
 
16 Vatter, invoking Derrida’s (1994) spectral reading of Marx, goes so far as to suggest that the political agency of the people 
can be considered as deconstructive of forms of government, the return of the conflictual event haunting the emergence of 




of the encounter might establish a veritable space for collective subjectivity emerges from the scattered 
references to Spinoza’s radical philosophy of subjectivity: the reversal of causes into ends; meaning as an 
‘eschataology of an imaginary meaning’; the critique of the illusion of subjectivity (that allows the individual to 
see himself as centre and master of the world, whereas he is entirely submitted to its determinations)—ideas 
from which may be extrapolated the hypothesis of individual subjectivity being derivative of ‘social 
subjectivity’ rather than its condition (Althusser 1997b, pp. 6-7). In Machiavelli’s thinking, however, the notion 
of social subjectivity becomes a more sustained and directive principle of political practice. It may be that the 
true contingency with respect to the encounter, thus with respect to the form of its effects (the state), is its 
potential revocability (the return to the beginning), what Vatter (2004, §43-44) refers to as the ‘sovereign in-
difference’, the people’s indifference to the state and its project of government, thus the ability to overturn the 




The Legal Subject 
 
The fact that the dominant class can only endure as a state through the transformation of its power based on 
violence to a power based on consent assumes, as we have already noted, the existence of free subjects—‘By 
means of the free consent of its subjects, [the prince] has to obtain the obedience that it could neither attain nor 
maintain by force alone’ (Althusser 2006 p.285). Thus, the association between subjection-subjectivity and the 
constitution of the dominant ideology is not arbitrary. The class struggle and the existing contradictions, 
invested with ideologies and social practices, and giving rise to their resolution and unification in the form of the 
dominant ideology, are as much the products as the producers of subjectivity. The subject, which can never be 
subsumed under the political, is produced from and within social antagonism. It is the strength of Althusser’s 
analysis to have theorised simultaneously the displacement of the subject and its embeddedness in the 
antagonistic relations. 
 Althusser does not develop a theory of the legal subject, nor does he explicitly articulate concepts that 
would explain the function of subjective rights within the modern nation state. However, we may propose some 
tentative connections between his theoretical constructs, as we have interpreted them, and legal subjectivity. In 
the first place, the role of ideology in producing subjects extends a correlative function to law: in short, there is 
no room for law to exist outside of its ideological uses. That subjective rights are conceived, and become 
juridically meaningful, only within the rubric of public law, the law of the state, entails that rights are 
themselves in the service of the state-machine with its participation in the class struggle. This is not to say that 
subjective rights work homogenously or uni-directionally. From the perspective of the state as a ‘class state’, it 
could be said that rights form part of the legal codification of the interests of property owners—‘it is an 
expression of the bourgeoisie and of its power to appropriate individual freedom and the market, and protect its 
prerogatives’ (Negri 2008, p. 111). However, from the more generalised perspective of the state as a separate 
and special body whose sole concern is the production of legal power, rights can be seen as the effects of the 
encounter between the state apparatus and concrete reality, that which is produced from the transformation of 
violence, in effect, the transmutation of social antagonism. It would then be the result of a creative, productive 
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process, and, above all, a practical process, by which the hegemony of the dominant class is reified, which is to 
say that the class origins of its power are repressed or neutralised. If we were to read Althusser’s notion of legal 
power sympathetically with Foucault’s analytics of power, we might suggest that at stake in this transformation 
are the power relations that Foucault refers to as microphysical: those multiple and diffuse relations 
(normalising and disciplinary, but also constitutive and individualising) that inhabit the social field, 17 
penetrating and circulating within the social fabric in strategic ways, irreducible to the monolithic exercise of 
force or violence inherent to the juridical form of the state. Speaking within the discourse that takes war as the 
paradigm for an analysis of power, the subject that asserts a right is concerned with a singular right (his right, 
derived from the relationship of conquest, domination or seniority), and declares a strategic, perspectival truth, 
whereas ‘universal truth and general right are illusions or traps’ (Foucault 2003, p. 269). The legal and political 
subject is formed through power relations that are depersonalised (neither ‘sovereign’ nor ‘governed’ are 
essential categories) and exercised to give effect to a certain mode of governmental rationality. Ultimately, the 
mechanisms of subjection and the economic processes of reproduction belong to the same economy of power; 
the individual body as labour power is both a productive force and a subjected body.18 Similarly, we could find 
in Althusser a co-extensive relationship between the productive power of law (in maintaining the reproduction 
of the relations of production) and the subject that is produced through ideological interpellation. The legal 
subject that emerges, in one sense, is defined by that process of interpellation, with all its inherent limitations, 
but in another, actively represents the constitution of legal power reflective of the violence of social antagonism 
– this would be the space of his singular right and strategic truth. 
 In the second place, Althusser’s critique of the state through the prism of aleatory materialism radically 
alters the stakes of political subjectification. As with the contingent economic and security imperatives which, 
for Foucault, marked a shift in the political technologies of government, the problem of constituting political 
authority is bound up with the singularity of events that render a national, unified government both fortuitous 
and possible; that is to say, the birth of the conditions for the enduring state reflects the emergence of the 
necessary from the contingent. The conjuncture and facticity inherent to the encounter projects a new emphasis 
on the concern with the reproduction of the mode of production, in the sense of an overriding materialism to the 
reproduction of social practices—for example, the relations that govern the processes of capitalist production 
give form to certain social structures, which, in turn, produce other structures, but always as the products of 
chance encounters (thus, both causes and effects are marked by their aleatory nature). ‘For the aleatory 
materialist, all structural relations have both a history and a need for continuous reproduction’ (Hardy 3013, p. 
25). While the process associated with the history of social structures and their changes is said to be lacking a 
transcendental subject per se, social relations themselves may be considered to produce forms of subjectivity. 
The relation of forces that constitutes a conjuncture, with its inhrerent tension and agonism, and the resulting 
possibility of change, gives presence to social subjectivity, ‘that of a conflictual human group, that is, of a class 
 
17 It is worth bearing in mind, as a point of distinction,that for Foucault the social field is not defined by its contradictions. 
As Deleuze remarks, it is one of Foucault’s great innovations in the theory of power ‘that a society does not contradict itself, 
or hardly does so…it strategizes itself, it makes up strategies’ (2007, p. 127). 
  
18 ‘This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; 
it is largely as a force of production that the body is invested with relations of power and domination; but, on the other hand, 
its constitution as labour power is possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is also a political 
instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body 




and therefore of antagonistic classes’ (Althusser 1997b, p. 7). This form of subjectivity would not merely reflect 
the conflictual system of the relation of forces, it would give structure to their coincidence and participate in the 
restructuring of the conjuncture as part of the continuous reproduction of relations. This is arguably one aspect 
of the political practice emerging from the confluence of necessity and contingency that can serve to transform 
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